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A DEFERENCE-BASED DILEMMA: THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
LEWIS v. THOMPSON FOR ACCESS TO NON-EMERGENCY 
HEALTH BENEFITS FOR UNDOCUMENTED ALIEN CHILDREN 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most intriguing social questions facing the United States at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century is how to handle the mass immigration of 
undocumented aliens.1  The issue has created an ongoing debate between 
political pundits and talking heads, demonstrations are seen both for and 
against illegal aliens, and minutemen build private barriers attempting to slow 
the flood of illegal immigration into the country.  Fears and speculation abound 
as to what social, political, and economic consequences this immigration 
deluge will have upon the nation.  Congress has attempted to stem illegal 
immigration by authorizing state denial of many government funded health 
benefits such as Medicaid.2  Many states have answered by passing regulations 
that deny Medicaid and other non-emergency benefits to undocumented or 
illegal aliens.3  Beyond the panic and politics are the illegal immigrants 
themselves.  Are they criminals or just men and women in search of a better 
life for their children?  This Note is designed to discuss just one small aspect of 
the present illegal immigration situation: When and under what circumstances 
are illegal immigrants entitled to constitutional protection under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?  This Note is especially 
concerned with the eligibility of non-citizen children to receive Medicaid and 
other non-emergency health benefits, and the process for determining the 
appropriate scope of review standard for the Welfare Reform Act and 
subsequent state statutes denying non-citizen children these benefits. 
To examine these issues fully, it is imperative to note United States 
jurisprudential and legislative history in regards to non-citizens’ rights as well 
as the modern trends.  American jurisprudence has changed a great deal since 
the early 1970s with respect to the protection given to illegal aliens under the 
Constitution.  Moreover, both sides of the issue have compelling and 
passionate advocates claiming that their interests are more compatible with 
 
 1. In this Note, the terms “immigrant” and “alien” are used interchangeably. 
 2. See Gail P. Dave et al., Developments in Policy: Welfare Reform, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 221, 224 (1997). 
 3. See infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
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economic and political development.  In 2001, the Second Circuit encountered 
a case which it used as a springboard for addressing these issues.  In Lewis v. 
Thompson, the court of appeals systematically examined the statutory and 
constitutional eligibility of illegal alien women and their children to receive 
Medicaid benefits.4 
Part I of this Note will explain the scope and severity of the major illegal 
immigration issues currently plaguing the United States.  Part II will explore 
the judicial development of the Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth 
Amendment with respect to illegal alien access to publicly funded programs.  
Part III will examine the procedural history and rationale of the Lewis opinion.  
In conclusion, Part IV will analyze the Lewis holding and its implications for 
illegal alien children’s possible access to Medicaid and other non-emergency 
health care benefits. 
I.  THE IMPACT OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
The bosom of America is open to receive not only the Opulent and respectable 
Stranger, but the oppressed and persecuted of all Nations and Religions. 
—George Washington5 
America has long been known throughout the world as a land of milk and 
honey.  For instance, a well known political pundit once asked an Indian friend 
why he was so eager to come to America; his friend replied that he wanted to 
“live in a country where even the poor people are fat.”6  Immigration has 
historically been seen as a fundamental aspect of American culture, evidenced 
today by the fact that one in five residents of the United States is an immigrant 
or has at least one immigrant parent.7  However, the increasingly large number 
of undocumented immigrants has had a substantial effect on social, economic, 
and political institutions. 
 
 4. 252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 5. Letter from General George Washington to the Members of the Volunteer Association 
and other Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Ireland who have lately arrived in the City of New York 
(Dec. 22, 1783), in 27 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 253, 254 (John C. Fitzpatrick 
ed., 1938). 
 6. DINESH D’SOUZA, WHAT’S SO GREAT ABOUT AMERICA 77 (Penguin Putnam 2002). 
 7. Elisabeth J. Sweeney Yu, Addressing the Economic Impact of Undocumented 
Immigration on the American Worker: Private RICO Litigation and Public Policy, 20 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 909, 913 (2006); see also Cragg Hines, Some Mean to Give 
Thanks for Drawbridge They’d Raise, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 24, 2004, at B9. 
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A. The Modern Illegal Immigration Deluge 
It is estimated that out of the approximately thirty-eight million immigrants 
in the United States, roughly one-third million are here illegally.8  Mexico is 
the largest source for unauthorized migration, contributing over seventy 
percent of the United States’ undocumented persons.9  Further, it is estimated 
that the net growth of illegal immigrants in the United States (new illegal 
immigration minus deaths, legalizations, and emigration) has been roughly 
500,000 per annum since the 1990s.10  Because of the tremendous growth in 
the number of illegal immigrants, Congress and many U.S. citizens have begun 
to harbor fears that this population shift will adversely affect the U.S. 
economy.11  These fears range from the belief that illegal immigrants will take 
jobs otherwise filled by citizens, to the idea that everything from costs of 
education to demands on medical providers will increase beyond the nation’s 
capabilities.12  These fears were not without some merit, as most illegal 
immigrants are drawn to the United States by the numerous American 
businesses willing to employ cheap, compliant labor.13 
An added concern for many U.S. citizens involves the significant burden 
placed upon the government (and thus taxpayers) to provide essential social 
services to a new low-income group.14  Many citizens believe that the U.S. has 
a moral duty to protect the “unalienable rights” of the less fortunate within the 
 
 8. Steven A. Camarota, Center for Immigration Studies, Immigrants in the United States, 
2007: A Profile of America’s Foreign-Born Population, BACKGROUNDER, Nov. 2007, at 1, 1, 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2007/back1007.pdf (data from 2007 Current Population Survey from 
the U.S. Census Bureau); see also Estimated Number of Illegal Immigrants in U.S., 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/us/0603/charts.immigration/frameset.exclude.html?eref=yahoo 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2008) (citing Pew Hispanic Center) (estimating that 11.1 million illegal 
immigrants resided in the U.S. in 2005). 
 9. Yu, supra note 7, at 915. 
 10. Center for Immigration Studies, Illegal Immigration, http://www.cis.org/topics/ 
illegalimmigration.html [hereinafter CIS, Illegal Immigration] (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
 11. William Booth, One Nation, Indivisible: Is it History?, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1998, at 
A1, A18. 
 12. Seam Park, Note, Substantial Barriers in Illegal Immigrant Access to Publicly-Funded 
Health Care: Reasons and Recommendations for Change, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 567, 571 (2004); 
Steven A. Camarota, Center for Immigration Studies, A Jobless Recovery? Immigrant Gains and 
Native Losses, BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 2004, at 1, 1 (2004), http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/ 
back1104.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); see also STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CENTER FOR 
IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE WAGES OF IMMIGRATION: THE EFFECT ON THE LOW-SKILLED 
LABOR MARKET 3, 5 (1998), http://www.cis.org/articles/1998/wagestudy/wages.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2008). 
 13. CIS, Illegal Immigration, supra note 10. 
 14. Park, supra note 12, at 571 (2004) (noting that state and local governments are “often 
left with the financial burden of providing essential social services to a needy, indigent 
population”). 
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nation.15  Yet rarely is the tension between moral duty and economic 
responsibility as stark for Americans as it is within the debate over how 
governmental benefits should be allocated with respect to illegal aliens.16  
Opponents of government-provided health care for illegal aliens argue that an 
unfair burden would be imposed upon citizen taxpayers who must finance such 
benefits.17  They argue that this will only drain the already limited financial 
pool from which public resources are derived, thus redistributing federal 
benefits from citizens to illegal aliens.18  Proponents of publicly funded health 
care argue that providing preventative care to illegal aliens will actually be 
more cost-efficient, as it will prevent the spread of communicable diseases and 
reduce the risk of transmission to citizens, and reduce the severity of eventual 
health problems within the immigrant community.19  The welfare reform 
packages of the mid-1990s contributed to the debate by further limiting 
government benefits available to illegal or unqualified aliens.20 
B. Effect of Welfare Reform on Illegal Aliens’ Access to Federal Benefits 
During the mid-1990s, immigrants and welfare beneficiaries “sustained 
repeated political attacks from candidates seeking to capitalize on voter anxiety 
about job security and the decay of the nation’s welfare system.”21  The 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRA or Welfare Reform Act) and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 were the 
resulting bills of the welfare reform period that have had a significant effect on 
 
 15. Alexander V. Neill, Human Rights Don’t Stop at the Border: Why Texas Should Provide 
Preventive Health Care for Undocumented Immigrants, 4 SCHOLAR 405, 424 (2002). 
 16. See id. at 429; see generally Julia Field Costich, Legislating a Public Health Nightmare: 
The Anti-Immigrant Provisions of the “Contract With America” Congress, 90 KY. L.J. 1043 
(2002). 
 17. See Neill, supra note 15, at 430 (noting that opponents of federally funded health 
benefits “often argue that it creates a significant drain on limited local public resources”); see also 
Madeleine Pelner Cosman, Illegal Aliens and American Medicine, 10 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & 
SURGEONS 6, 6 (2005). 
 18. Neill, supra note 15, at 430. 
 19. Costich, supra note 16, at 1058 (“Because immigrants are less likely than U.S. citizens to 
have health insurance, and because they often come from regions where communicable diseases 
are more common than in the U.S., denying them access to diagnosis and treatment of these 
diseases makes it not only likely that they will suffer readily avoidable consequences themselves, 
but that they will increase citizens’ exposure.”). 
 20. Id. at 1048. 
 21. Welfare Reform—Treatment of Legal Immigrants—Congress Authorizes States to Deny 
Public Benefits to Noncitizens and Excludes Legal Immigrants From Federal Aid Programs: 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
1191, 1191 (1997). 
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immigration restrictions.22  In enacting these bills, Congress intended to break 
the cycle of welfare dependency among the poor by restricting eligibility for 
benefits and by promoting work-based incentives.23  Congress determined that 
the number of illegal immigrants entering the country was becoming a 
political, social, and economic problem and noted that “[c]urrent eligibility 
rules for public assistance and unenforceable financial support agreements 
have proved wholly incapable of assuring that individual aliens do not burden 
the public benefits system.”24  Through subsequent statutory changes, 
Congress has “attempted to devolve its federal immigration power and thereby 
evade the constitutional prohibition on state anti-immigrant discrimination.”25  
These welfare statutes have performed several functions in regards to 
immigration, including making distinctions among different groups of aliens in 
the provision of federal benefits, altering existing Medicaid programs, and 
delegating authority to the states to regulate important aspects of immigrant 
access to public benefits.26 
The PRA authorized the denial of benefits depending on whether or not an 
alien falls within an enumerated class of “qualified aliens,” including “legal 
permanent residents, asylees, refugees, those granted withholding of 
deportation, and those paroled for at least one year.”27  Immigrants who are not 
qualified, a group which includes illegal aliens, are ineligible for most federal 
and state benefits.28  As a result, the PRA has had a particularly strong effect in 
 
 22. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251; Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare Reform Act), Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105; Dave et al., supra note 2, at 224–27. 
 23. Dave et al., supra note 2, at 221. 
 24. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(4) (2000).  Congress explicitly described its national policy toward 
immigrants by stating: “It continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that . . . 
aliens within the Nation’s borders not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather 
rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private 
organizations . . . .”  8 U.S.C. § 1601(2). 
 25. Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, 
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 500–01 (2001). 
 26. Dave et al., supra note 2, at 222–23. 
 27. Id. at 225; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(1)–(7) (defining which aliens are “qualified” 
under the statute). 
 28. Dave, supra note 2, at 225.  Qualified aliens remain eligible for many non-means-tested 
public benefit programs, including: Adoption Assistance, Administration on Developmental 
Disabilities, Adult Programs/Payments to Territories, Agency for Health Care Policy and 
Research Dissertation Grants, Child Care and Development Fund, Clinical Training Grant for 
Faculty Development in Alcohol & Drug Abuse, Foster Care, Health Profession Education and 
Training Assistance, Independent Living Program, Job Opportunities for Low Income 
Individuals, Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, Medicare, Medicaid, Mental Health 
Clinical Training Grants,  Native Hawaiian Loan Program, Refugee Cash Assistance, Refugee 
Medical Assistance, Refugee Preventive Health Services Program, Refugee Social Services 
Formula Program, Refugee Social Services Discretionary Program, Refugee Unaccompanied 
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preventing illegal alien children from receiving publicly funded health 
benefits.29  The PRA did allow a number of federal means-tested programs to 
remain available for qualified alien children; however, unqualified alien 
children (including illegal alien children) receive no special protections.30  
Moreover, prior to the PRA, it was possible for states to afford these 
undocumented children state-funded benefits; yet now these states must “enact 
subsequent laws to ‘affirmatively’ provide undocumented immigrants with 
such state or locally-funded services if they wish to continue providing 
them.”31  So after the passage of the PRA, illegal alien children were only 
expressly eligible for emergency care, immunizations, and treatment for certain 
communicable diseases.32 
The PRA also had a significant effect on transforming the Medicaid 
system.33  Prior to the PRA’s passage, Medicaid eligibility was limited to the 
“deserving poor,” generally considered to be the aged, blind, disabled, and 
children and their caretaker relatives.34  However, after the PRA, these 
traditional categories no longer defined Medicaid eligibility.35  Today 
Medicaid covers four main groups, including: (1) pregnant women,36 (2) 
 
Minors Program, Refugee Voluntary Agency Matching Grant Program, Repatriation Program, 
Residential Energy Assistance Challenge Option, Social Services Block Grant.  United States 
Department of Health and Human Services, Summary of Immigrant Eligibility Restrictions Under 
Current Law, as of 10/04/2004, http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/immigration/restrictions-sum.htm (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
 29. See Cindy Chang, Health Care for Undocumented Immigrant Children: Special 
Members of an Underclass, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1271, 1274 (2005). 
 30. Id. at 1274 (noting that the PRA explicitly exempts a number of federal means-tested 
benefits for qualified children from its provision that even qualified immigrants may not receive 
federal means-tested benefits for the first five years after their entry into the country, including 
“school lunch programs, child nutrition programs, foster care assistance, student assistance under 
the Higher Education Act of 1965 and the Public Health Service Act, means-tested programs 
under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and Head Start” (citations omitted)). 
 31. Chang, supra note 29, at 1275–76 (noting that “approximately half of the states have 
enacted affirmative legislation to provide qualified immigrant children with health care benefits 
lost through the Act.  Yet few have extended these measures to undocumented immigrant 
children.” (citations omitted)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). 
 32. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1161(b)(1), 1621(b); see also Chang, supra note 29, at 1276.  These 
emergencies include, among others, “medical assistance for emergency conditions, short-term, 
non-cash, in-kind emergency disaster relief, assistance under the National School Lunch Act and 
the Child Nutrition Act of 1966, immunizations, and various education programs.”  Dave et al., 
supra note 2, at 227. 
 33. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 774 
(5th ed. 2004). 
 34. Id. at 773. 
 35. Id. at 774. 
 36. Id. at 774 (noting that “now every state Medicaid program must cover all pregnant 
women in families with incomes of up to 133 percent of the poverty level” and that “[i]n 2000, 
Medicaid paid for 1.46 million births, 36 percent of the births in the United States . . . .”). 
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children,37 (3) low-income elderly and disabled Medicare recipients,38 and (4) 
disabled children and adults.39  This functional change in traditional categories 
of Medicaid eligibility has had a significant impact on both citizen and 
immigrant eligibility for public health benefits.40 
Besides barring “unqualified aliens” from receiving public benefits and 
changing the very structure of eligibility for these benefits, the welfare reform 
laws also give states far greater freedom in determining the extent to which 
they will restrict benefits.41  Consequently, the PRA’s changes “compelled 
nearly every state legislature to rewrite vast swaths of state law.”42  It granted 
states full discretion to determine the eligibility of immigrants for “federal 
TANF, Social Services Block Grant, and Medicaid benefits, as well as state 
public assistance benefits.”43  Despite their new found autonomy, states were 
reluctant to restrict immigrant eligibility for public benefits.44  This devolution 
of immigration power to the states raises several Constitutional issues, 
including whether Congress violated the Equal Protection Clause when it 
authorized the denial of “eligibility for public benefits to a class of 
noncitizens,” and whether a state “impermissibly encroach[es] on exclusive 
federal authority over immigration” by exercising discretion over benefit 
eligibility.45 
Part II of this Note will examine the jurisprudential history of Equal 
Protection Clause challenges relating to the denial of benefits to immigrants.  It 
will begin by examining the traditional divergent standards of review between 
federal and state alienage classifications via the Graham v. Richardson46 and 
Mathews v. Diaz47 decisions.  Part II will conclude by analyzing the procedure 
the Supreme Court used in determining the applicability of a “heightened 
 
 37. Id. at 774 (“States must currently cover all children under age six with family incomes 
below 133 percent of the poverty level and children under age 19 in families with incomes up to 
100 percent of the poverty level . . . .”). 
 38. FURROW, ET AL., supra note 33, at 775 (“Medicaid has become a Medicare supplement 
policy for low-income elderly and disabled Medicare recipients, so-called ‘dual eligibles.’”). 
 39. Id. (“Though the 1996 Welfare Reform Act cut back on SSI eligibility for children, it 
also provided that children formerly eligible for SSI could continue to receive Medicaid.”). 
 40. See id. at 774–75. 
 41. Steven M. Dawson, The Promise of Opportunity—And Very Little More: An Analysis of 
the New Welfare Law’s Denial of Federal Public Benefits to Most Legal Immigrants, 41 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1053, 1068 (1997). 
 42. Wishnie, supra note 25, at 514. 
 43. Dave et al., supra note 2, at 231. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id.; see also Wishnie, supra note 25, at 512 (“Devolution in general, and devolution of 
the immigration power in particular . . . were central to congressional design of the PRA.”). 
 46. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 47. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
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scrutiny” scope of review standard in Plyler v. Doe48 and Kadrmas v. 
Dickinson Public Schools.49 
II.  JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ILLEGAL 
ALIENS 
The Court makes no attempt to disguise that it is acting to make up for 
Congress’ lack of ‘effective leadership’ in dealing with the serious national 
problems caused by the influx of uncountable millions of illegal aliens across 
our borders.50 
The Fourteenth Amendment demands that no state shall “deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”51  The illegal 
immigration quandary introduces numerous Equal Protection Clause issues.  
These issues can be broken into two main subsections: (1) the divergent 
standards of review between federal and state classifications based on 
citizenship; and (2) the Constitutional issues that arise from treating illegal or 
undocumented aliens differently from resident aliens and U.S. citizens. 
A. Divergent Standards of Review 
In Graham v. Richardson, the United States Supreme Court examined the 
scope of review standard that should be applied when a state classifies people 
based on alienage.52  In Graham, the plaintiff brought suit against the 
Commissioner of Arizona’s Department of Public Welfare, seeking welfare 
benefits which were allegedly due.53  The plaintiff claimed that she met all 
requirements for eligibility for Assistance to Persons Permanently and Totally 
Disabled (APTD) benefits except for the fifteen-year residency requirement.54  
The plaintiff claimed that this residency requirement “violate[d] the Equal 
Protection Clause” and that “the regulation of aliens has been pre-empted by 
Congress.”55  In a unanimous opinion, the Graham Court noted that 
It has long been settled, and is not disputed here, that the term “person” in [the 
context of the Equal Protection Clause] encompasses lawfully admitted 
resident aliens as well as citizens of the United States and entitles both citizens 
 
 48. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 49. 487 U.S. 450 (1988). 
 50. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 242–43 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 52. Wishnie, supra note 25, at 505 (“In Graham, the Court examined alienage restrictions in 
Arizona and Pennsylvania welfare statutes.”). 
 53. Graham, 403 U.S. at 367–68. 
 54. Id. at 367. 
 55. Id. at 368. 
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and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the State in which they 
reside.56 
The Court explained that “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a 
‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is 
appropriate.”57  The Court reasoned that since aliens pay taxes and may be 
called into the armed forces, they should likewise be eligible to receive welfare 
benefits.58  Consequently, the Graham Court held that “a state statute that 
denies welfare benefits to resident aliens and one that denies them to aliens 
who have not resided in the United States for a specified number of years 
violate[s] the Equal Protection Clause.”59 
Only five years after the Graham decision, the Supreme Court again 
considered a provision restricting the benefits for resident aliens in Mathews v. 
Diaz, but this time dealing with Medicare, a federal statute.60  In Mathews, all 
plaintiffs were resident aliens lawfully admitted to the United States less than 
five years prior to the suit.61  All would have been eligible for the Medicare 
Part B supplemental medical insurance program, but were denied enrollment 
because they were not citizens or permanent residents, nor had they resided in 
the United States for five years.62  The Court noted that “[t]he fact that all 
persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does 
not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the 
advantages of citizenship . . . .”63  The Court decided that since “[i]n the 
exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress 
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens,” the 
restriction should be upheld unless it was “wholly irrational.”64 
The main distinction between the holdings of Graham and Mathews was 
that the Supreme Court had many reservations about treading into the 
traditionally congressional area of immigration power.65  The Mathews Court 
 
 56. Id. at 371 (citing Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948); Truax 
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). 
 57. Id. at 372 (citation omitted). 
 58. Graham, 403 U.S. at 376. 
 59. Id.; see also Wishnie, supra note 25, at 505–06 (“[T]he Court then rejected the asserted 
state interests in preserving scarce fiscal resources for citizens as insufficiently compelling to 
justify the alienage classifications.”). 
 60. Wishnie, supra note 25, at 506. 
 61. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69 (1976). 
 62. Id. at 70–71. 
 63. Id. at 77–78. 
 64. Id. at 79–80, 83. 
 65. Id. at 81–82 (noting that decisions made by Congress or the President in the area of 
immigration and naturalization deserve “a narrow standard of review”); see also Wishnie, supra 
note 25, at 506–07 (“[T]he Court sounded the classic themes of the plenary power doctrine: 
Regulation of immigration ‘may implicate our relations with foreign powers,’ and the judicial 
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noted that the two cases “involve[d] significantly different considerations,” 
because the “Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially 
different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power 
over immigration and naturalization.”66  Consequently, ever since the Mathews 
ruling, “state alienage classifications have been subjected to strict scrutiny and 
generally invalidated, whereas federal alienage classifications have been 
reviewed for rationality and generally upheld.”67 
As evidenced by the Graham and Mathews rulings, the Supreme Court has 
developed a relatively consistent stance to maintain divergent standards of 
review for federal and state alienage classifications.68  Federal statutes 
concerning alien restrictions will be reviewed under a “rational basis” scope of 
review standard, while state statutes limiting alien rights will usually be 
reviewed under a “strict scrutiny” scope of review standard.69  Part II.B of this 
Note will examine the constitutional issues that arise from treating illegal or 
undocumented aliens differently from their citizen counterparts, chiefly 
concentrating on the disparate treatment of undocumented or illegal alien 
children. 
B. Equal Protection: A Question of Deference 
In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of 
providing free access to primary and secondary public education to all 
children, including children born abroad and brought into the United States 
illegally.70  In Plyler, the plaintiffs were children who could not establish that 
they had been legally admitted into the United States, and were thus 
undocumented aliens.71  After initially allowing non-citizen children to attend 
school free of charge, the school adopted a policy “requiring undocumented 
children to pay a ‘full tuition fee’ in order to enroll.”72  A further issue was the 
fact that the state of Texas refused “to reimburse local school boards for the 
education of children who cannot demonstrate that their presence within the 
United States is lawful.”73  The Plyler court held that the plaintiffs in this case 
 
branch is ill-equipped to apply other than a ‘narrow standard of review of decisions made by the 
Congress or the President in the area of immigration.’”  (citations omitted)). 
 66. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84, 86–87; see also Wishnie, supra note 25, at 507. 
 67. Wishnie, supra note 25, at 507 (citations omitted). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 457 U.S. 202, 230; see also Chang, supra note 29, at 1278 (noting that in Plyler, the 
Supreme Court “recognized access to free public primary and secondary education as 
undocumented immigrant children’s constitutional right under Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection”). 
 71. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 206. 
 72. Id. at 206 n.2. 
 73. Id. at 215. 
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could claim the benefit of the Equal Protection Clause, but also noted that this 
“only begins the inquiry.”74 
In order to properly apply the Equal Protection Clause to the situation 
before it, the Court had to decide by which scope of review standard the statute 
in question should be judged.75  The first, the most common, and the most 
deferential standard used to judge the validity of a state action is the assurance 
that the statute bears some rational and “fair relationship to a legitimate public 
purpose.”76  However, the Court noted that if it applied so deferential a 
standard to every state classification, it would not be faithful to its obligations 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.77  Therefore, the Court noted that a second 
standard exists for states’ classifications “that disadvantage a ‘suspect class,’ or 
that impinge upon the exercise of a ‘fundamental right.’”78  Under this “strict 
scrutiny” approach, the State is required to “demonstrate that its classification 
has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”79  
This approach was created in order to protect against “legislation imposing 
special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond 
their control.”80  However, in Plyler, the Court utilized a third standard, thus 
permitting the Court to “evaluate the rationality of legislative judgment with 
reference to well-settled constitutional principles.”81  This intermediate or 
“heightened scrutiny” standard is appropriate only when “concerns sufficiently 
absolute and enduring can be clearly ascertained from the Constitution and [the 
Court’s] cases.”82 
In Plyler, the Court rejected the idea that illegal aliens were a “suspect 
class.”83  The Court reasoned that “alienage classifications may be intimately 
related to the conduct of foreign policy, to the federal prerogative to control 
access to the United States, and to the plenary federal power to determine who 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 216 (“A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that 
roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns 
both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the State to 
remedy every ill.”). 
 76. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 216–17 (footnotes omitted). 
 79. Id. at 217.  The Court further explained that certain groups “have historically been 
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection 
from the majoritarian political process.”  Id. at 216 n.14 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80. Id. at 216 n.14. 
 81. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 n.16. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 219 n.19 (“Unlike most of the classifications that we have recognized as suspect, 
entry into this class, by virtue of entry into this country, is the product of voluntary action.  
Indeed, entry into the class is itself a crime.”). 
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has sufficiently manifested his allegiance to become a citizen of the Nation.”84  
Yet the Court made special note of illegal alien children, considering them to 
be special members of an underclass who “can affect neither their parents’ 
conduct nor their own status.”85  Moreover the Court stated that “no child is 
responsible for his birth and penalizing the . . . child is an ineffectual—as well 
as unjust—way of deterring the parent.”86  The Court further distinguished the 
denial of the right of education from the denial of other rights by reasoning that 
“[b]y denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live 
within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic 
possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of 
our Nation.”87  Consequently, the Supreme Court derived a “heightened 
scrutiny” test under which a state must demonstrate the rationality of its statute 
by showing that it furthers a “substantial state interest.”88  The Supreme Court 
held that the State of Texas did not meet this heightened standard, and that 
financial incentive is not a substantial enough interest to justify denying these 
children a free public education.89  Therefore, the Supreme Court ordered that 
the children be allowed to attend Texas public schools free of charge.90 
The Supreme Court revisited the matter of “heightened scrutiny” review in 
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools.91  In an opinion authored by Justice 
O’Connor, the Court set forth a test to determine when the “unique 
circumstances” language of Plyler would apply.92  In Kadrmas, the plaintiffs 
were a Dickinson schoolchild and her mother.93  Soon after the Dickinson 
School Board began charging a bus service fee, the plaintiffs brought an action 
claiming that the fee violated their Equal Protection rights by placing a greater 
obstacle to education in the path of the poor than it did in the path of wealthy.94  
The Court had previously rejected the suggestion that “statutes having different 
effects on the wealthy and the poor should on that account alone be subjected 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)). 
 86. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 
175 (1972)). 
 87. Id. at 223. 
 88. Id. at 230 (“If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public 
education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified 
by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 230. 
 91. 487 U.S. 450, 457 (1988). 
 92. Id. at 459; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[I]n these unique 
circumstances, the Court properly may require that the State’s interests be substantial and that the 
means bear a ‘fair and substantial relation’ to those interests.”). 
 93. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 454. 
 94. Id. at 458. 
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to strict equal protection scrutiny.”95  After rejecting the strict scrutiny 
approach, the Court then turned to the questions of whether Plyler’s “unique 
circumstances” existed and whether the “heightened scrutiny” test was 
appropriate for the facts presented in Kadrmas.96  Since the plaintiff was not 
“penalized by the government for illegal conduct by her parents” and since 
there was no “creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates,” the Court 
held that the “unique circumstances” of Plyler did not exist.97  As a result, 
neither the strict scrutiny nor heightened scrutiny standard was applicable, and 
it was necessary for the plaintiffs to satisfy the increased burden of 
demonstrating that the statute was arbitrary and irrational.98 
Consequently, through Kadrmas, the Court has developed a two-pronged 
test to determine whether a specific set of facts satisfies the “unique 
circumstances” language of Plyler.99  This test involves determining (1) 
whether a statute punishes an under-protected group for the illegal conduct of 
others beyond its control and (2) whether a statute creates a risk of severe and 
enduring consequences for the under-protected group.100  If both of these 
factors are met, then it is proper to judge the statute under the “heightened 
scrutiny” standard of Plyler.101  Part III will examine the Lewis court’s analysis 
in determining whether the denial of prenatal care and automatic eligibility for 
Medicaid to illegal alien mothers and their children violated statutory or Equal 
Protection principles.  Part III will also explain the way in which the Lewis 
court decided scope of review issues through the use of the Kadrmas test. 
III.  LEWIS V. THOMPSON: A FRAMEWORK IS INTRODUCED 
It is not better to leave even written laws ever unchanged. 
—Aristotle102 
Judge Jon O. Newman of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals authored 
the opinion in Lewis v. Thompson.103  The opinion begins with a detailed 
background summarizing the facts and procedural history of Lewis, which is 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 459. 
 97. Id. at 459–60. 
 98. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 461–62. 
 99. Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 591 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Supreme Court has noted 
that it has not extended Plyler beyond its ‘unique circumstances.’”). 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 48 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1998) (350 
B.C.E.). 
 103. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 569. 
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very briefly outlined below.104  The opinion then discusses the social and 
economic costs of denying prenatal care to mothers and their unborn children, 
and subsequently provides a rather detailed legislative history of Medicaid’s 
relationship with respect to both illegal alien mothers and their children.105  
Next, the court examined the statutory and constitutional challenges to the 
denial of prenatal care.106  Finally, the Lewis court discussed the constitutional 
challenges to the denial of automatic eligibility for Medicaid assistance to the 
citizen children of illegal immigrant mothers.107 
A. Procedural History of Lewis 
Lewis v. Thompson was the last of a long line of appeals and reviews of an 
injunction involving the non-emergency care provisions of the Medicaid 
statute.108  In Lewis, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the statutory 
and constitutional implications of the State of New York’s denial of Medicaid 
coverage for prenatal care to an illegal immigrant mother and the denial of 
automatic eligibility for her citizen child.109  Plaintiff Lydia Lewis filed the 
initial claim on behalf of “a putative class initially certified to include ‘all 
aliens residing in the State of New York who have been denied Medicaid on 
the basis of their alienage.’”110  The principal claim of the plaintiff was that 
“the denial of all Medicaid services on the basis of alienage was either contrary 
to the Medicaid statute or unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection.”111 
The Lewis court began its opinion by explaining the complex statutory 
history of Medicaid, noting that the statute is “one of the most intricate ever 
drafted by Congress.”112  Medicaid is defined as a “co-operative federal/state 
cost-sharing program designed to enable participating states to furnish medical 
assistance to persons whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the 
costs of necessary medical care and services.”113  Though state participation in 
Medicaid is optional, once a state participates, it must comply with federal 
 
 104. See id. at 569–79 (tracing the development of Medicaid legislation from its founding to 
the present time and noting key Acts such as the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, the amended Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, and 
the Welfare Reform Act of 1996). 
 105. Id. at 579–81. 
 106. Id. at 582–87. 
 107. Id. 587–92. 
 108. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 569 (“[T]he prenatal care provisions of the Medicaid statute are 
among the most . . . intricate ever drafted by Congress.”  (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 109. Id. at 572. 
 110. Id.  The class was later amended to include “‘all aliens residing in New York State who 
have applied or attempted to apply for Medicaid but have been or would be denied on the basis of 
their alienage.’”  Id. at 572 n.8. 
 111. Id. at 572. 
 112. Id. at 569. 
 113. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 569 (quoting DeJesus v. Perales, 770 F.2d 316, 318 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
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statutes and regulations.114  Three main categories of beneficiaries are eligible 
for Medicaid: the “mandatory categorically needy,” “the optional categorically 
needy,” and the “optional medically needy.”115  Participating states need only 
cover the “mandatory categorically needy” but may cover the other two groups 
if they so desire.116  The State of New York began participating in the 
Medicaid program in 1965 and chose to extend coverage to all three eligibility 
categories.117  However, for some time it was unclear whether Medicaid 
granted coverage for pregnant women or prenatal care.118  In 1975, the 
Supreme Court held that “states were not required to offer prenatal care, but 
left open the possibility that states were nonetheless permitted to offer such 
care.”119  The Medicaid statute was also initially silent on the availability of 
Medicaid to aliens.120  In 1973, Congress amended the Social Security Act in 
order to explicitly deny social security benefits to aliens.121  Consequently, the 
State of New York issued an additional regulation denying Medicaid eligibility 
to any alien who was not a permanent resident or otherwise permanently 
residing in the United States under color of law.122  Thus by 1979, although the 
Medicaid statute was silent as to prenatal care and aliens, the State of New 
York interpreted the statute to “permit states to offer prenatal care to pregnant 
women, but not to permit states to offer any aid to non-PRUCOL aliens.”123 
Over the course of the next decade, many changes and revisions were 
made to the Medicaid statute.  In 1981 Congress passed the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA ‘81), which ended the practice of allowing 
states to give Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC) money to 
pregnant women on the theory that their fetuses were “dependent children,” yet 
continued to authorize states to provide pregnant women with AFDC funding 
during the last three months of pregnancy if they would be eligible upon the 
birth of their child.124  Three years after OBRA ‘81, Congress made Medicaid 
coverage of needy pregnant women mandatory by adding “qualified pregnant 
 
 114. Id. at 569. 
 115. Id. at 570. 
 116. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)).  This category principally includes 
individuals already receiving some other need-based government benefit, most commonly Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  Id. at 570 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I)). 
 117. Id. at 570. 
 118. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 571. 
 119. Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 584–86 (1975); Lewis, 252 F.3d at 571 n.5. 
 120. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 571. 
 121. Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, 1471 (1972); Lewis, 252 F.3d at 571. 
 122. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 571. 
 123. Id. at 572.  PRUCOL aliens are those aliens Permanently Residing in the United States 
Under Color of Law.  Id. at 571 & n.7. 
 124. Id. at 572.  The Lewis court noted that “[t]he concept that underlies deeming a woman 
eligible for government benefits if she would be eligible upon the birth of her child has become 
known as ‘constructive birth.’”  Id. 
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women or children” to the list of the “mandatory categorically needy” through 
the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.125  One year later, Congress again expanded 
Medicaid funding for pregnant women via the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA ‘85) which “broke the link between 
AFDC and Medicaid,” thus “permitting a pregnant woman to receive Medicaid 
assistance even if she would be ineligible for AFDC for some non-financial 
reason upon the birth of her child.”126 
On July 14, 1986, Judge Sifton of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York handed down the initial ruling in Lewis I, 
holding that the State of New York’s regulation “barring non-PRUCOL[127] 
aliens from receiving any Medicaid benefits violated the Medicaid statute.”128  
Shortly after the ruling in Lewis I, Congress passed OBRA ‘86, which 
amended the Medicaid statute to “bar aid to non-PRUCOL aliens for any 
condition short of a medical emergency.”129  After the new alienage 
restrictions were executed, the State of New York moved to vacate the Lewis I 
injunction.130  The State’s motion was promptly rejected by the district court 
on April 23, 1987.131  After an additional attempt by New York to abandon its 
prenatal care program for non-PRUCOL aliens, the District Court issued a 
permanent injunction forbidding the denial of care.132  On January 31, 1992, 
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on appeal, concluding 
that “this was one of those ‘rare and exceptional’ circumstances where 
legislative intent and purpose should prevail over clear statutory text.”133 
 
 125. Id. at 573. 
 126. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(n)(1)(C) (2000)). 
 127. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.408 (defining PRUCOL and listing sixteen non-exclusive examples 
of PRUCOL aliens). 
 128. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 573 (citing Lewis v. Gross (Lewis I), 663 F. Supp. 1164, 1184 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986)). 
 129. Id. at 573–74 (internal footnote omitted); see also The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874, 2058 (1986).  OBRA ’86 defines a medical 
emergency as 
a medical condition (including emergency labor and delivery) manifesting itself by acute 
symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of 
immediate medical attention could reasonably result in—(A) placing the patient’s health 
in serious jeopardy, (B) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (C) serious dysfunction 
of any bodily organ or part. 
Id.   
 130. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 574. 
 131. Id.  The district court concluded that members of the plaintiff class were still entitled to 
retroactive relief.  Lewis v. Grinker (Lewis II), 660 F. Supp. 169, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 132. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 575–76 (concluding that since the child will be an American citizen at 
birth, “even a non-PRUCOL mother will be eligible for AFDC upon the birth of her child, and 
therefore will be a ‘qualified pregnant woman’ for purposes of Medicaid”). 
 133. Id. at 576–77 (citing Lewis v. Grinker (Lewis V), 965 F.2d 1206, 1222 (2d Cir. 1992)).  
The Second Circuit followed a different path than the district court, by instead focusing on the 
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In the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, Congress imposed “sweeping restrictions 
on aliens’ access to federally sponsored government aid” which dramatically 
altered the landscape of this case once again.134  Under the Welfare Reform 
Act, “an alien who is not a qualified alien (as defined in section 1641 of this 
title) is not eligible for any Federal public benefit (as defined in subsection (c) 
of this section).”135  Consequently, the Welfare Reform Act expanded the class 
of aliens ineligible for Medicaid and restricted the use of Medicaid funds to 
only “medical care that is strictly of an emergency nature,” a category that was 
interpreted to not include prenatal care.136  After the passage of the Welfare 
Reform Act, the State of New York attempted once more to convince the 
district court to reverse its injunction, but was once again refused.137  On 
appeal, the court of appeals was asked to consider (1) whether the Welfare 
Reform Act’s denial of prenatal care to unqualified aliens had a rational basis 
and therefore did not violate equal protection and (2) whether the denial of 
automatic eligibility for Medicaid coverage at birth denied aliens’ already born 
citizen children equal protection.138 
 
congressional legislative history.  Id. at 576.  The Second Circuit noted that “any attempt to 
impute to Congress an intent to deny prenatal care in these circumstances would be premised on 
the questionable assumption that Congress believed the law to have been settled against treating 
fetuses as ‘individuals under the age of 21’ entitled to Medicaid assistance in their own right.”  Id. 
at 576 n.16. 
 134. Id. at 577. 
 135. Id. at 577 (quoting  8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2000)).  A “qualified alien” is narrowly defined 
as 
an alien who, at the time the alien applies for, receives, or attempts to receive a Federal 
public benefit, is— (1) an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . , (2) an alien who is granted asylum under 
section 208 of such Act . . . , (3) a refugee who is admitted to the United States under 
section 207 of such Act . . . , (4) an alien who is paroled into the United States under 
section 212(d)(5) of such Act . . . for a period of at least 1 year, (5) an alien whose 
deportations is being withheld under section 243(h) of such Act . . . , (6) an alien who is 
granted conditional entry pursuant to section 203(a)(7) of such Act . . . as in effect prior to 
April 1, 1980[,] or (7) an alien who is a Cuban and Haitian entrant (as defined in section 
501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980). 
8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2000). 
 136. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 578 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 380 (1996)). 
 137. Id. at 578–79 (noting that the district court had concluded that the heightened scrutiny 
standard of Plyler was applicable and had found that the State had not met its burden of 
“demonstrating substantial government purposes for the denial,” therefore violating the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 138. Id. at 583–84, 587–92. 
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B. Implications of Welfare Reform for Prenatal Care 
Judge Newman began the court’s analysis with the policy considerations of 
publicly funded prenatal care.139  The court noted that children without access 
to prenatal care are at a much greater risk for disease and disability during their 
lives than children who have received prenatal care.140  Moreover, studies 
indicated that prenatal care is “vastly more cost-efficient than is treating the 
medical ailments that result from a lack of prenatal care.”141  These studies 
estimated that “$2 to $10 can be saved in medical treatment costs for every 
dollar spent on preventative prenatal care.”142  Additionally, the record 
indicated that “the costs of furnishing prenatal care for the more than 13,000 
annual births to undocumented pregnant women in New York would be almost 
completely recouped” by the cost savings of their increased level of health at 
birth.143  Finally, the lack of prenatal care may result in substantial public 
health costs.144  The court noted that during the 1980s, “the infant mortality 
rate in this country was the highest among 22 industrialized countries.”145  
Indeed, after Congress increased the access of the poor to prenatal care, the 
rate of infant mortality steadily improved.146 
Despite the public policy considerations raised by the plaintiffs, the court 
agreed with the Government that the Welfare Reform Act “should be read to 
deny federally-sponsored prenatal care to unqualified aliens.”147  The terms of 
the statute are straightforward, as it states that a non-qualified alien “is not 
eligible for any Federal public benefit” unless she meets one of the 
exceptions.148  The Lewis court noted that the only exception that may apply is 
the exception that “permits aid necessary to treat an ‘emergency medical 
condition.’”149  However, the statute defines “emergency medical condition” 
narrowly, and thus makes clear that “conventional prenatal care is not within 
 
 139. Id. at 579. 
 140. Id. (noting that “[c]hildren who are denied prenatal care are substantially more likely to 
be born premature and with debilitating physical and mental disabilities, are more likely to be 
plagued by an array of life-threatening diseases throughout their lives, and have a much shorter 
life expectancy.”).  Prenatal care “usually consists of a series of routine visits to a doctor, who 
monitors the health of the mother and the fetus and counsels the mother on steps she can take to 
ensure the birth of a healthy child.”  Id. 
 141. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 579 (further noting that “[i]f problems are observed during prenatal 
monitoring, it is less expensive to intervene while the woman is pregnant than to treat the child’s 
resulting life-long disabilities.”). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 579. 
 147. Id. at 580. 
 148. 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2000); Lewis, 252 F.3d at 580. 
 149. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 580 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)(A)). 
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the exception.”150  The plaintiffs stressed legislative purpose and asserted that 
since prenatal care saves the state money in the long run, and the principal 
purpose of the Welfare Reform Act was to reduce federal spending, it was 
within the “general congressional purpose” to allow spending in this area.151  
The Lewis court rejected this assertion, stating that it could not “ignore clear 
text and clear intent on a specific topic to achieve a more general congressional 
purpose.”152 
The plaintiffs further argued that “even an illegal alien mother should be 
entitled to receive prenatal care as a ‘qualified pregnant women’ under [42 
U.S.C. § 1396d(n)(1)].”153  The plaintiffs contended that this section defined a 
“qualified pregnant women” to include a woman who would satisfy the 
requirements of the former AFDC program if her “unborn fetus were born.”154  
Under the old AFDC program, a woman was eligible if her child was 
eligible.155  Thus, the plaintiffs argued that illegal immigrant mothers have a 
statutory entitlement in anticipation of their future citizen children.156  The 
court rejected this argument as well, reasoning that the plaintiffs’ argument 
would be valid only if “the Medicaid statute regarded the unborn fetus as itself 
eligible for medical assistance.”157  Instead, the court interpreted the statute as 
considering the pregnant women to be the recipients of care, not the future 
citizen child.158  Thus, according to the Lewis court, section 1396d(n)(1) is 
clearly trumped by the new alienage restrictions which “deny eligibility to ‘an 
alien who is not a qualified alien’ ‘[n]otwithstanding any other provision of 
law.’”159  The Welfare Reform Act was specific where OBRA ‘86 was not, 
giving a “clear indication that Congress was aware of the consequences of a 
literal reading of its blanket alienage restrictions to preclude prenatal care.”160  
After the Lewis court interpreted the Welfare Reform Act to express a 
congressional intent to deny prenatal care to unqualified aliens, it turned its 
attention to whether these statutory restrictions were constitutional. 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 580–81. 
 152. Id. at 581. 
 153. Id. at 581 & n.24 (“The Welfare Reform Act ended AFDC, but still tied eligibility for 
Medicaid assistance to the eligibility standards of AFDC as they existed before AFDC was 
eliminated.”). 
 154. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 581. 
 155. Id. (“[T]he alienage eligibility restrictions in the AFDC statute, which apply only to the 
child, are inapposite since an alien mother’s child born in this country is a United States 
citizen.”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 581 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2000)). 
 160. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
970 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:951 
C. Constitutional Challenges to Denial of Prenatal Care 
In making its determination as to the constitutionality of the denial of 
prenatal care to unqualified aliens, the Lewis court separated the challenge into 
two issues concerning (1) unqualified pregnant women and (2) the unborn 
fetus.161 
1. Constitutionality as Applied to Unqualified Pregnant Women 
The Lewis court was quick to note that it would use a “rational basis” test 
as the appropriate level of scrutiny with regards to illegal alien women.162  The 
court referred to the Supreme Court’s holding in Mathews v. Diaz, which 
upheld the government’s “broad power over naturalization and 
immigration.”163  Because rational basis scrutiny applied, the government had 
“no obligation to produce evidence . . . or empirical data[,]” and instead could 
“base its statutes on rational speculation.”164  Under this test, there “need only 
be a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some 
legitimate governmental purpose.”165  The court further noted that “[a]lthough 
no court of appeals has yet considered the Welfare Reform Act’s denial of 
prenatal care to unqualified aliens,” most courts had found the “deprivation of 
other government benefits to unqualified aliens” to survive rational basis 
scrutiny.166 
In Lewis, the court found that Congress had enacted the legislation in order 
to remove “‘the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability 
of public benefits.’”167  Evidence of the ability of government-funded prenatal 
care to encourage illegal immigration was not required; it was sufficient that 
the proposition be “reasonably conceivable.”168  Accordingly, the court held 
that “[a]lthough it seems likely that many alien women will illegally immigrate 
to obtain the benefit of citizenship for their children, undeterred by ineligibility 
for prenatal care in the event of pregnancy, Congress is entitled to suppose that 
 
 161. Id. at 582. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.; see also Mathews, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (noting that Congress can validly enact 
laws for aliens that “would be unacceptable if applied to citizens”). 
 164. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 582 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 165. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 166. Id. at 583; see also Aleman v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 1191, 1201–04 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding the denial of food stamps to certain divorced aliens survived rational basis scrutiny). 
 167. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 583 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1601(6) (2000)).  Congress explained its 
position by noting that “[i]t is a compelling government interest to enact new rules for eligibility 
and sponsorship agreements in order to assure that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with 
national immigration policy.”  8 U.S.C. § 1601(5). 
 168. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 583 (internal quotation omitted). 
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the denial of care will deter some of them.”169  Since congressional discretion 
in regards to immigration is extremely broad, its supposition satisfied rational 
basis review.170  Thus, the Welfare Reform Act’s denial of prenatal care 
survived rational basis scrutiny with regards to illegal immigrant mothers.171 
2. Constitutionality as Applied to the Fetus 
An unborn child, or fetus, is not a “person” under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and thus “cannot validly claim a denial of equal protection.”172  
The court explained that if “a fetus lacks constitutional protection to assure it 
an opportunity to be born, we see no basis for according it constitutional 
protection to assure it enhanced prospects of good health after birth.”173  
Legislation may create for the child “a cause of action to obtain compensation 
for the consequences of prenatal injury,” but a “legislative benefit does not 
imply a constitutional requirement.”174  The Lewis court noted that as a general 
matter, “only immutable characteristics are entitled to heightened protection 
under the Equal Protection Clause.”175  While in utero, the fetus has “no 
constitutional right to equal protection,” and the “Equal Protection clause 
cannot retroactively create a claim that was not cognizable before birth.”176  
The Lewis court then considered the plaintiffs’ contention that “the born child, 
who indisputably is a citizen entitled to equal protection of the laws,” can 
claim Medicaid coverage from the moment of birth.177 
 
 169. Id. at 584 (“[I]t is reasonable for Congress to believe that some aliens would be less 
likely to hazard the trip to this country if they understood that they would not receive government 
benefits upon arrival . . . .”). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 585; see, e.g., Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 228–29 (D. Conn. 1972) (“[I]t is 
difficult to imagine how a statute permitting abortion could be constitutional if the fetus had 
fourteenth amendment rights.”); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). 
 173. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 586. 
 174. Id. (“Roe’s preclusion of a Fourteenth Amendment right for a fetus would evaporate if a 
child could assert a constitutional claim for prebirth injury.”). 
 175. Id.; see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (noting that close relatives are 
not a suspect class because “they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing 
characteristics that define them as a discrete group”).  Claims asserted by a person for harm 
sustained in a previous status rarely if ever arise in an equal protection context.  Lewis, 252 F.3d 
at 586. 
 176. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 587. 
 177. Id. at 586.  The so-called “automatic eligibility” provision of the statute was added in 
DRA ’84.  Id. at 587. 
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D. Denial of Citizen Child’s Automatic Eligibility for Medicaid Benefits 
Under the current law, “a newborn child of a mother receiving Medicaid is 
automatically eligible for Medicaid-sponsored care at birth . . . .”178  The court 
acknowledged the importance of this automatic eligibility, stating that it “is 
important because it assures immediate care, unfettered by paperwork and 
bureaucratic hurdles, at a critical time in the child’s life.”179  The State argued 
that because unqualified alien mothers cannot satisfy the requirement of 
“‘receiving medical assistance under a State plan on the date of the child’s 
birth,’” no citizen child of an unqualified mother is automatically eligible.180  
The Lewis court rejected this outcome, stating that “[a]lthough all alien and 
citizen mothers are equally prevented from obtaining automatic coverage,” 
only children of unqualified mothers “have been denied automatic eligibility at 
birth because their mothers were prohibited” by law from obtaining Medicaid 
benefits.181  The State argued that the child of an alien mother is not 
disadvantaged since the child may obtain retroactive Medicaid coverage to the 
date of birth if the child is eligible in its own right.182  The court rejected this 
argument as well, holding that although retroactive coverage “eases the 
financial problem,” it does not “solve the medical problem of not receiving 
immediate medical services for the child . . . .”183  The Lewis court concluded 
that it could not interpret the statute to permit automatic Medicaid coverage at 
birth for citizen children of alien mothers, since Congress was obviously 
“willing to risk incurring the added costs of treating children denied prenatal 
care because of the alienage of their mothers” in order to deter illegal 
immigration.184 
After interpreting the statute unfavorably for the plaintiffs, the Lewis court 
then focused on the equal protection issue.185  In doing so, the court 
concentrated on what standard of scrutiny was appropriate in regards to the 
children of illegal immigrant mothers.186  The court first pointed out that the 
highly deferential or rational basis standard that is usually “appropriate in 
matters of immigration” was not applicable here, because the claim was 
brought on behalf of a citizen child.187  Since the denial of automatic eligibility 
was imposed on the children “solely because of the unqualified alien status of 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 588. 
 180. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(4) (2000)). 
 181. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 588. 
 182. Id. at 588. 
 183. Id. at 588–89. 
 184. Id. at 589. 
 185. Id. at 589–90. 
 186. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 590–91. 
 187. Id. at 590; see also Lake v. Reno, 226 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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their mothers,” the Lewis court held that a heightened scrutiny standard of 
review was appropriate.188 
In comparing the situation in Plyler to the facts before it, the Lewis court 
noted that on the one hand, denial of “public education . . . is more burdensome 
than the brief postponement of obtaining Medicaid coverage,” while on the 
other hand “the Plaintiffs’ claim is stronger in that here it is asserted on behalf 
of citizen children, whereas the claimants in Plyler were alien children.”189  In 
order to determine what conditions constitute the “unique circumstances” of 
Plyler, the Lewis court decided to use a test formulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools.190  Under this two-
prong test, in order for a heightened or intermediate scrutiny approach to be 
appropriate, the statute in question must (1) penalize children for the illegal 
conduct of their parents and (2) risk significant and enduring adverse 
consequences to the children.191 
In Lewis, the court found that “the first circumstance [of the Kadrmas test] 
fully applies” because the citizen children were only denied automatic 
eligibility because of their mothers’ illegal status.192  The court then found that, 
like the claim in Plyler, a social welfare benefit unrelated to immigration had 
“been denied on a discriminatory basis that violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.”193  This denial, coupled with the increased risk of prolonged adverse 
health risks resulting from the denial of prenatal care, functioned to satisfy the 
second prong of the Kadrmas test.194  Therefore, the Lewis court held that the 
“unique circumstances” of Plyler existed, and thus the heightened scrutiny 
standard was applicable.195 
Under heightened scrutiny review, the statute must further “some 
substantial goal of the State.”196  Here, the court concluded that denying citizen 
children of illegal immigrant mothers a social welfare benefit, in this case 
automatic eligibility for Medicaid, did not further any substantial goal of the 
state, especially when considering the financial and medical benefits automatic 
eligibility would make available.197  Consequently, the Lewis court held that 
the citizen children of the plaintiff class were protected under the Equal 
 
 188. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 591.  The court also made clear that “citizen claimants with an equal 
protection claim deserving of heightened scrutiny do not lose that favorable form of review 
simply because the case arises in the context of immigration.”  Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. 
 191. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988); Lewis, 252 F.3d at 591. 
 192. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 591. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982); Lewis, 252 F.3d at 591. 
 197. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 591. 
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Protection Clause and were entitled to receive the same automatic eligibility 
that the citizen children of legal mothers receive.198 
Lewis dealt mainly with the statutory and equal protection issues involved 
in denying prenatal care and automatic eligibility for Medicaid to illegal 
mothers and their citizen children.  Though not explicitly at issue, Lewis also 
provided a framework and test to determine whether illegal or unqualified alien 
children are entitled to publicly funded health benefits.  Part IV will examine 
the current denial of health benefits to non-citizen children within the 
framework of Lewis, determine that a heightened scrutiny standard is 
appropriate, and recommend a future course of action for Congress and the 
courts. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEWIS V. THOMPSON DECISION FOR HEALTH CARE 
ACCESS FOR UNQUALIFIED NON-CITIZEN CHILDREN 
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep 
under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.199 
—Anatole France 
Lewis v. Thompson is the leading federal appellate case examining the 
constitutionality of denying Medicaid benefits to illegal aliens.200  The Lewis 
court held that denial of publicly funded prenatal care with respect to 
unqualified pregnant mothers or their unborn children survived rational basis 
scrutiny.201  The analysis of prenatal care in Lewis is useful if only to show that 
courts and legislatures have struggled with the notion of placing a lifetime of 
hardship on innocent or unborn children.202  If not for the preclusive effect of 
the term “person” not encompassing a fetus in utero, the Lewis court’s 
rationale suggests that it may have decided the prenatal issue differently in 
order to protect the future children.203  Additionally, the Lewis court held that 
the denial of Medicaid benefits for citizen children of unqualified alien 
mothers failed to survive a heightened scrutiny analysis.204  Thus, since Lewis 
 
 198. Id. at 591–92. 
 199. Id. at 588 n.32 (quoting ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE, 118 (1894)). 
 200. Cases examining similar issues include Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1257 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (holding a new law denying optional Medicaid coverage for legal aliens did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause), and Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (N.Y. 2001) 
(holding statute denying Medicaid benefits to non-qualified aliens did not satisfy strict scrutiny 
review and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 201. See supra notes 162–177 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra notes 139–146 and accompanying text. 
 203. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 587 (noting that a child may have had a valid claim but since it was 
“in utero . . . .  the fetus had no constitutional right to equal protection”). 
 204. See supra notes 195–198 and accompanying text. 
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considered the rights of both unqualified alien adults and their citizen children, 
the case is a sufficient springboard to understanding the constitutional rights of 
unqualified alien children (or non-citizen children brought to the United States 
by illegal alien parents), an issue no court has yet examined.  Lewis does not 
simply give a framework, but also a test, taking both the “unique 
circumstances” language of Plyler v. Doe and its applicable test in Kadrmas v. 
Dickinson Public Schools, and subsequently applying this test to the denial of 
health benefits to the citizen children of illegal immigrants. 
Under the Lewis analysis of automatic eligibility, it seems certain that 
future courts would uphold the statutory interpretation that the Welfare Reform 
Act denies Medicaid benefits to any unqualified non-citizen child.  The statute 
is very clear; it states that Medicaid benefits (both prenatal care and automatic 
eligibility at birth) will be denied to any “alien who is not a qualified alien”  
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.”205  However, a constitutional 
analysis may bring about very different results.  In fact, although not explicitly 
at issue in Lewis, the case seems to suggest that the denial of Medicaid benefits 
to even non-citizen children would be invalidated on equal protection grounds. 
Using the Lewis court’s application of the Kadrmas test to citizen children 
as a guide, this Note will now examine the constitutional question of whether 
the denial of publicly funded health benefits to unqualified, non-citizen 
children violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Part IV begins by explaining why the traditional divergent standard of review 
for federal and state classifications does not apply.  This Note will then show 
how the denial of health benefits to non-citizen children satisfies the “unique 
circumstances” of Plyler by examining each prong of the Kadrmas test with 
regards to the eligibility of non-citizen children to receive publicly funded 
health benefits.206  Part IV will conclude by arguing that denying non-citizen 
children health benefits has not had the intended effect, but rather has 
extremely disadvantaged a subclass of innocent children. 
A. The Traditional Divergent Standard of Review Analysis Does Not Apply 
In order to determine whether the denial of Medicaid and other non-
emergency health benefits to unqualified, non-citizen children violates the 
Equal Protection Clause, it is necessary to decide whether the statute is entitled 
to additional deference.  Because the denial was authorized by congressional 
statute and immigration has historically been the domain of Congress, extra 
deference may be appropriate.  As noted earlier, in the cases of Graham v. 
Richardson and Mathews v. Diaz, federal statutes concerning alien restrictions 
 
 205. 8 U.S.C. § 1161(a) (2000). 
 206. It should also be noted that the Supreme Court has held that since undocumented 
immigrants are not a suspect class and since public health care via Medicaid is not a fundamental 
right, a strict scrutiny approach is not appropriate.  See Chang, supra note 29, at 1279. 
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will normally be reviewed under a rational basis standard, while state statutes 
limiting alien rights will usually be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard.207  
Since the Welfare Reform Act is a congressional statute intended to deter 
immigration, it would seem to be subject to rational basis scrutiny.208  Yet in 
Lewis, the court held that a heightened scrutiny test was appropriate in some 
instances, despite the fact that the statute was enacted by Congress.209  Lewis is 
easily distinguished, however, because in that case the automatic eligibility 
provision dealt specifically with the citizen children of undocumented aliens, 
rather than the aliens themselves.210  Thus the key issue becomes whether a 
heightened level of scrutiny is appropriate for the current denial since it 
involves non-citizen children as well as congressional authorization via the 
Welfare Reform Act. 
One immigration scholar has noted that “[t]he rationale for the divergent 
standard is that, at the federal level, equal protection norms must be balanced 
against the deference traditionally accorded to exercises of the federal 
immigration power.”211  However, through the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, 
Congress has attempted to devolve some of its plenary power over immigration 
to the states in such a way as to avoid constitutional prohibition of state alien 
restrictions.212  In Graham, the Supreme Court held that congressional 
authorization of state denials of benefits to resident aliens appeared to violate 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.213  However, the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent decision in Mathews suggests that since immigration is a field of 
constant economic and political change, its regulation is more appropriately 
left to the legislature than the judiciary, especially since the regulation of aliens 
is “intricately interwoven” with foreign relations.214 
The Welfare Reform Act suggests that states are permitted to deny illegal 
aliens and their children eligibility for Medicaid and other non-emergency 
 
 207. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra notes 180–181 and accompanying text. 
 211. Wishnie, supra note 25, at 496. 
 212. Id. at 501; see generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of 
Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (1984). 
 213. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.  “Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment ‘grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute’ its equal protection 
guarantees.  Dave et al., supra note 2, at 236 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 
n.10 (1966)).  “The Court has also rejected the argument that state regulation authorized by 
federal legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause is exempt from rational review under the 
Equal Protection Clause.”  Id. at 236 n.102 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 
880 (1985)). 
 214. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 & n.17 (“Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to 
the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference.”). 
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health benefits, but does not require this denial.215  Thus, each state must pass 
its own regulations, within certain federal parameters, in order to put this 
denial into effect.216  If the Welfare Reform Act explicitly required the denial 
of publicly funded health benefits, it would seem that rational basis scrutiny 
would be appropriate, though not necessarily mandated.  However, 
congressional authorization of state denial of benefits has different 
consequences with respect to judicial deference than explicit statutory denial.  
Further, the Welfare Reform Act not only attempts to determine and influence 
immigration policy, but also welfare policy, an area traditionally controlled by 
the states. 217  Since the reason for granting Congress deference in regards to 
immigration is its “close relationship to foreign policy,” it may be proper to 
subject domestic welfare policy to a less deferential review standard.218 
Thus, since the Welfare Reform Act’s denial of health benefits concerns a 
joint exercise of federal and state power and considers both immigration and 
welfare policy issues, the traditional divergent standard of review analysis is, at 
best, questionable, and future courts should consider other factors.  Justice 
Marshall noted in his concurrence in Plyler that varying levels of scrutiny 
depend upon “the constitutional and societal importance of the interest 
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which 
the particular classification is drawn.”219  Accordingly, the courts in both 
Plyler and Lewis took a deeper look into which particular factors should be 
considered in determining whether a heightened level of scrutiny was 
appropriate when dealing with the regulation of immigrant benefits. 
B. The Sins of the Father 
Because of the many common characteristics shared by non-citizen 
children denied publicly funded health benefits and the children involved in 
both Plyler and Lewis, it seems that the present denial of Medicaid benefits 
ought to be given a heightened scrutiny standard of review.  The heightened 
scrutiny standard of Plyler was deemed to be appropriate only under the 
 
 215. See 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (2000) (explaining that a state is authorized to determine alien 
eligibility for state public benefits). 
 216. See id. § 1622(b). 
 217. Wishnie, supra note 25, at 569 (stating that “courts should heed the four words with 
which Justice Blackmun opened the Court’s modern alienage jurisprudence: ‘These are welfare 
cases.’”) (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 366 (1971)). 
 218. Dave et al., supra note 2, at 237. 
 219. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (Marshall, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) and further 
noting that “a class-based denial of public education is utterly incompatible with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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“unique circumstances” that were present in that case.220  Under the Kadrmas 
test, the first harm that the statute must produce in order to fulfill these “unique 
circumstances” is “penalizing children for the illegal conduct of their 
parents.”221  It is evident that the Welfare Reform Act’s authorized denial of 
non-emergency health benefits for non-citizen children would satisfy this 
element of the Kadrmas test.  Like the children in both Plyler and Lewis, non-
citizen children are denied health benefits, including Medicaid or other non-
emergency benefits, solely due to the fact that their parents have entered the 
country illegally.222 
While many U.S. citizens may be uncomfortable with reserving public 
health benefits (funded by American tax dollars) for non-citizens, it is 
important to realize that undocumented children have “no responsibility for 
their unlawful presence.”223  Thus, even though an argument could be made 
against comparing non-citizen children to the citizen children entitled to 
benefits under Lewis, in both cases the children were innocents who could 
“affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.”224  Penalizing these 
children with inadequate or non-existing health care is an unfair and 
undeserved punishment.  As the Plyler court noted, “[e]ven if the State found it 
expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their children, 
legislation directing the onus of a parent’s misconduct against his children does 
not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.”225  Consequently, 
congressional attempts to control illegal immigration have resulted only in 
penalizing innocent non-citizen children through restrictions on their access to 
health care.  Having seemingly satisfied the first element of the Kadrmas test, 
the next issue to be considered is whether the denial of publicly funded, non-
emergency health benefits has created a risk of “significant and enduring 
adverse consequences” for non-citizen children and the nation.226 
C. A Lasting Adverse Impact 
Like the children involved in Plyler and Lewis, non-citizen children are 
currently being denied a key government benefit, access to preventative health 
 
 220. Id. at 239 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the circumstances were unique since 
the children were “singled out by the State and then penalized because of their parents’ status.”). 
 221. Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 591; see also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 
U.S. 450, 459. 
 222. See 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (2000); Undocumented alien children are eligible only for 
government assistance for “emergency care, immunizations, and treatment for communicable 
diseases.”  Chang, supra note 29, at 1272. 
 223. Chang, supra note 29, at 1287. 
 224. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)). 
 225. Id.  See also supra note 86 and accompanying text (noting that the Court found it unfair 
and unjust to penalize the child for the illegal activities of the parents). 
 226. See Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 591 (2001). 
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care.227  In Plyler, the Court made sure to note that “public education is not a 
‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution . . . .  But neither is it merely 
some governmental ‘benefit’ indistinguishable form other forms of social 
welfare legislation.”228  The Lewis court echoed this sentiment with regards to 
publicly funded health care, noting that “a social welfare benefit, itself 
unrelated to immigration, has been denied on a discriminatory basis that 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.”229  The current denial of publicly funded 
health care to non-citizen children creates no less of a risk of severe and 
enduring consequences for these children than the risk created for the children 
of Plyler and Lewis. 
While the children in Plyler were denied a public education and the citizen 
children in Lewis were simply denied automatic eligibility for Medicaid 
benefits, the current denial of Medicaid benefits for non-citizen children could 
lead to a much more lasting and severe outcome.  The Welfare Reform Act 
currently authorizes the denial of all non-emergency public health benefits 
including Medicaid, Medicare, and State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP).230  Without these programs very few unqualified alien families 
would be able to afford adequate medical care for their children.231  As one 
scholar put it, “[a]dequate health care is vital to the very being of a child and is 
inextricably tied to all other determinants of a child’s ability to thrive, 
including education.”232  The American Academy of Pediatrics has advocated 
for providing health care to all children, noting that prevention and treatment 
programs for infants and children can increase their future level of health.233  
Though education is important to a child becoming a productive member of 
society, it seems much more important for the child to have at least some 
minimal level of health.  Without the benefits of health care early on, a child 
has little chance of becoming a healthy, productive member of society.234  
Given the fact that most infectious diseases do not discriminate based on race 
or national origin, it seems unjust that non-citizen children should be deprived 
 
 227. See Chang, supra note 29, at 1272. 
 228. Plyler, 557 U.S. at 221. 
 229. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 591. 
 230. See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a), (c) (2000); see also Costich, supra note 16, at 1053. 
 231. Kaiser Commission, Immigrants’ Health Care Coverage and Access (2003), 
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/Immigrants-Health-Care-Coverage-and-Access-fact-
sheet.pdf (“Low-income non-citizens are more than twice as likely to be uninsured as low-income 
citizens.”). 
 232. Chang, supra note 29, at 1288. 
 233. Costich, supra note 16, at 1064–65 (“[P]ublic health initiatives by intent and design are 
universal, and the protection of the public health requires access by the entire community.”) 
(citing Comm’n on Cmty. Health Servs., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Health Care for Children of 
Immigrant Families, PEDIATRICS, July 1997, at 153, 154). 
 234. See infra notes 259–263 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
980 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:951 
of preventative health benefits simply because they happened to be born 
abroad.235 
Since non-citizen children are currently punished for the “illegal conduct 
of their parents” and this punishment places a severe and enduring hardship on 
them for the rest of their lives, both prongs of the Kadrmas test are satisfied.236  
Therefore a heightened scrutiny standard is appropriate for determining 
whether congressionally authorized, state-based denial of non-citizen 
children’s eligibility for Medicaid and other preventative health benefits 
violates Equal Protection Clause principles. 
D. A Denial of Health Benefits to Non-Citizen Children Cannot Withstand 
Heightened Scrutiny 
Under the heightened scrutiny standard of Plyler, a state must show that its 
statute furthers a substantial interest of the state.237  In its application of this 
standard, the Plyler court required not only that the statute further a substantial 
state interest, but also that the benefit to the state outweigh the resulting 
economic and social costs.238  The denial of Medicaid and other non-
emergency health benefits to non-citizen children fails to satisfy this standard 
since it fails to deter immigration, fails to save government moneys, threatens 
the health of United States citizens, and unjustly punishes innocent children. 
One of the explicit purposes of the Welfare Reform Act was to “remove 
the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public 
benefits.”239  However, there is much empirical research that indicates that 
denying health benefits to non-citizens does very little to deter immigration.240  
The Lewis court noted that under a rational basis test, like the test used in the 
Lewis prenatal care analysis, evidence proving deterrence is not necessary; 
rather “it is sufficient that [the] proposition be ‘reasonably conceivable.’”241  
However, under heightened scrutiny, some “credible evidence” must be 
presented by the state in order to show that a substantial government interest 
has been furthered.242  According to several recent immigration studies, the 
main incentive for illegal immigrants to enter the country is the promise of 
 
 235. Chang, supra note 29, at 1290–1291. 
 236. See supra notes 221–222 and accompanying text. 
 237. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (“[D]enial must be justified by a showing that it 
furthers some substantial state interest.”). 
 238. Id. (“[W]hatever savings might be achieved by denying these children an education, they 
are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the 
Nation.”). 
 239. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(6) (2000). 
 240. See generally, Chang, supra note 29; Neill, supra note 15; Park, supra note 12. 
 241. Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 583 (2001). 
 242. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229 (explaining that the state must offer “credible supporting 
evidence” to support its claim of furthering a substantial state interest). 
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employment, not education or health care for their children.243  Many illegal 
immigrants are so afraid of deportation that they do not even apply for public 
benefits at all.244  Not only has Congress chosen the wrong benefits to deny, 
but it has also failed to produce any substantial decrease in illegal immigration.  
Empirically, the growth rates of illegal immigration have continued to rise 
steadily despite the statutory restrictions.245  Indeed, as the Lewis court 
suggested, the limits of “rational speculation” are surely approached if one 
considers that illegal immigration will be deterred by the denial of health 
benefits to children.246 
Additionally, the denial of Medicaid and other preventive medical care for 
non-citizen children is simply not cost-efficient.  Many scholars have argued 
that allowing non-citizen access to preventive health care will actually lower 
overall health expenditures.247  Although the Welfare Reform Act authorizes 
the denial of many publicly funded health benefits, it still requires emergency 
services to be provided to unqualified aliens.248  It is estimated that emergency 
care can cost up to four to ten times as much as preventive care.249  
Consequently, state governments are much better off paying the small costs of 
preventive care early, rather than increasingly high costs of emergency care in 
the future.250  For example, children with low-birth weights who are denied 
access to medical care have an increased risk of becoming mentally or 
physically disabled.251  One estimate lists the lifetime health care costs for a 
disabled child at up to $400,000.252  In fact, treating the effects of preventable 
illness makes up 90% of all healthcare costs in the United States.253  Thus, it is 
clear that “preventive care is the solution . . . not the problem.”254 
 
 243. See Chang, supra note 29, at 1282; see also Pia Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, 
Immigration Policy: What are the Consequences of an Amnesty for Undocumented Immigrants?, 
9 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 21, 24–25 (2004). 
 244. See Chang, supra note 29, at 1283. 
 245. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 246. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 590; see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). 
 247. Chang, supra note 29, at 1292. 
 248. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 249. Park, supra note 12, at 581 (“[I]t costs less for health facilities to treat symptoms and 
conditions before they degenerate into emergencies that necessitate more elaborate procedures 
and care.”  (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
 250. See, e.g., Neill, supra note 15, at 430 (suggesting that preventive care “is less costly 
because it enables physicians to treat conditions before they degenerate into emergencies that 
necessitate more elaborate procedures and care”). 
 251. Id. at 434. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Prevent Disease Center, Health Care Statistics, http://preventdisease.com/worksite_ 
wellness/health_stats.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
 254. See Neill, supra note 15, at 432. 
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It is also evident that denying health care to undocumented children can 
create serious adverse health consequences for the rest of the country.255  By 
deferring the treatment of non-citizen children until an emergency situation 
arises, these children could expose numerous other individuals to 
communicable diseases.256  For example, the rate of tuberculosis and many 
other infectious diseases is ten to thirty times higher in the country of origin for 
many immigrants than in the United States.257  Diseases such as tuberculosis 
can remain dormant for long periods of time thus making detection improbable 
without continuous access to medical treatment and care.258  However, if 
access to preventative medical care is given, doctors will be able to protect 
U.S. citizens from the dangers of diseases which originate abroad by 
eliminating infectious diseases before they can spread.  For these reasons, it is 
in the interests of Congress to make sure diseases within the illegal immigrant 
community are diagnosed and treated early in order to preserve the health of 
both immigrants and U.S. citizens.  This objective cannot be accomplished 
unless the current statutory denial of publicly funded preventative health care 
to unqualified non-citizen children is altered or revoked. 
Finally, the denial of health benefits to non-citizen children constructively 
punishes these children for the crimes of their illegal alien parents and greatly 
reduces their chance to live healthy, productive lives.  Recent studies have 
shown that low-income illegal aliens are twice as likely to be uninsured as low-
income citizens.259  Thus, without government aid, most undocumented 
children have virtually no access to medical care.260  As a result, one in five 
children of undocumented parents is currently in poor or fair health and was 
not able to visit a doctor within the past year.261  The Lewis court noted that 
access to medical care during the first year of life can reduce the incidence of 
life-threatening illness by more than 40%.262  However, the lack of health care 
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at an early age can have dramatic consequences including learning difficulties, 
decreased future earnings, and even premature death.263 
For all of these reasons, the denial of publicly funded health care benefits 
for non-citizen children, through the Welfare Reform Act and subsequent state 
regulation, fails to further a substantial state interest.  The benefit to the 
regulating state is minimal, while non-citizen children, taxpayers, and the 
nation’s health are all put at a significant risk of lasting harm.  Congress 
authorized this denial under the guise of deterring illegal immigration by 
eliminating incentives and reducing the cost of publicly funded welfare 
benefits.  However, it seems that denying health benefits to unqualified alien 
children has failed to live up to congressional expectations.  The authorization 
to deny health benefits to undocumented children has had no significant effect 
on slowing illegal immigration, nor has the denial succeeded in reducing 
welfare expenditures.264  As no substantial interest of the state has been 
furthered, the denial of publicly funded health benefits to undocumented 
children fails to satisfy heightened scrutiny review and thus violates the equal 
protection rights of millions of innocent children. 
CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, the “unique circumstances” of Plyler exist once again.  
Non-citizen children are being punished for the illegal conduct of their parents, 
and the possible consequences are lasting and severe.  In Plyler, the Supreme 
Court considered it necessary to protect the innocent children involved and 
help them obtain access to a public education.265  After the Lewis decision, it 
seems only a matter of time until future courts attempt to protect non-citizen 
children as well through the application of heightened scrutiny review.  The 
initial congressional plan of deterrence and cost-efficiency has been frustrated, 
while the growth of illegal immigration has continued to accelerate.266  The 
courts have often been forced into the role of “moral compass” for the nation, 
and the current situation demands similar attention.  Yet despite the necessity 
of future court action, the courts should not reverse congressional and state 
legislation only to replace it with their own rulings.  The rise in illegal 
immigration is of pressing concern to many citizens, and its regulation has 
ripple down effects for foreign policy, national security, and the welfare 
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system.267  Since immigration is so closely tied to the public interest, it must be 
the people, through their duly elected representatives, who determine the future 
of immigration policy in the United States.  Thus, future courts should hesitate 
before assuming the burden of determining the appropriateness of 
congressionally authorized denial of health care benefits to unqualified alien 
children in order to allow Congress and state legislatures to make the changes 
necessary to bring about other means of deterrence not as threatening to 
notions of justice and equal protection. 
In considering the issues of illegal alien children and access to health care, 
it is important to consider that “we are talking about some of the most 
powerless people in society [children].”268  The United States has always 
valued its children, and has often assumed the role of protector for those who 
cannot protect themselves.269  Cost-benefit analyses can measure a great deal, 
but they fail to quantify the social costs of ignoring the basic principles of 
inalienable rights on which the United States was founded.270  After all costs, 
present and future, social and economic, are carefully evaluated, unqualified 
alien children should be accorded access to the public health benefits necessary 
to allow them the opportunity to live long, productive lives. 
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